Abstract. An examination is made of how the development of the Internet in Japan is likely to affect civic rights and the relationship between citizens and their government. This was undertaken to determine if the trajectory of Internet development in Japan, with its distinct locational and corporate biases, has followed the predictions of two prominent Japanese commentators: the visionary Kumon Shumpei who espoused an expansive international perspective that citizens will be transformed into 'netizens' in a virtual community; and the media analyst Kogawa Tetsuo, whose pessimistic views were targeted primarily at a national audience and concerned the adaptability of the Japanese to the 'permanent autonomous zones' created by information technology. The observations of these commentators on the relationship between the Internet and civil society are tested in an examination of the degree to which the social and political uses of the Internet have followed their conjectures by means of two case studies: the protest movements over United States bases in Okinawa, and the Nibutani Dam in southern Hokkaido-an area with a predominantly indigenous Ainu population. Although the authors report evidence that the Internet has extended the sphere of grass-roots political activity, they believe its effect is likely to be limited until there is a restructuring of Japanese political organisations and attitudes.
Japanese context, this idea was popularised by Masuda Yoneji's (1980) Utopian view of the coming information society.
With the emergence of the Internet, however, the focus of debate has shifted somewhat: discussions of the potential for closer communication between citizens and govWhmeht have tended to giveway to discussions of the potential for the creation of new autonomous citizens' networks, distinct from, though exerting influence on, conventional political structures. The issue, in other words, is one of the emergence of a potentially global electronically mediated form of civil society (Frederick, 1994) . Frequently, this electronic version of civil society is seen as a vehicle for the expression of opinions traditionally marginalised by the political establishment-the opinions of women, ethnic minorities, the young, etc. Writing of the US context, Steven Miller argues that "at best, if properly designed and implemented, the Nil [National Information Infrastructure] is capable of providing space for a huge number of voices and perspectives, giving communities a chance to authentically represent themselves in all their variety. It is capable of fostering the preservation and continued growth of traditional arts and culture" (1996, page 338; see also Dickenson, 1997, pages 107-109; Frederick, 1994) .
The concept of the Internet as a means of enlarging and strengthening civil society deserves serious attention. One problem with the concept, however, is that it commonly follows the convention of presenting information and communications networks as a 'space'-cyberspace-analogous with the public spaces of the ancient city-stateliterally as a 'forum' or 'electronic agora' within which civic discourse can take place (Travis, 1995) . Much recent work on technological networks, however, has suggested a far more complex image in which the networks are not simply a passive vehicle for human action, but form a dynamic system in which human and nonhuman elements act upon one another in unpredictable ways (Bingham, 1996; Latour, 1993; Silverstone et al, 1992; Thrift, 1996) . As Nigel Thrift observes, an understanding of the social potential of systems like the Internet requires a "concerted sense of the new electronic communications technologies as part of a long history of rich and often wayward social practices (including the interpretation of those practices) through which we have become 'socially acquainted' with these technologies" (1996, page 1472, emphasis in original) .
Use of the network, in other words, is constrained and shaped not only by unequal physical access (determined by geographical location, wealth, social status, gender, etc), but also by the 'cultural capital' which users bring to the network, and which is then, in turn, mobilised, developed, revalued, or devalued by the evolving protocols of network use (Mowlana, 1997, pages 102-105; Stallabrass, 1995) . For this reason, we have suggested that the term 'cyberstructure' is a more meaningful description of the system than the conventional 'cyberspace'.
These considerations have an important bearing on recent debates in Japan, where two of the most prominent commentators on the social implications of the Internet have been Kumon Shumpei and Kogawa Tetsuo. Kumon has an expansive view of how the Internet will change economic, social, and political systems and sees citizens being transformed into 'netizens' in a virtual community-a view reflecting his close associations with international commentators, notably Howard Rheingold (1993) (Kumon and Aizu, 1994 ). Kogawa's ideas on permanent autonomous zones and his critique of the Japanese state's relationship to new communication technologies seem to be more specifically targeted at a Japanese audience. Netizens Currently, Kumon heads the Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM) at the International University of Japan, and is perhaps the most enthusiastic and optimistic Japanese supporter of the Internet. Kumon's vision of the world has all the broad sweep of earlier Japanese predictions about the information society. He relies on highly schematised pictures of long-term social change, and on the heavy use of computer-age neologisms (table 1) . The modern age, for example, is seen as evolving through three revolutions: the wave of militarisation which took place in the 15th and 16th centuries; the wave of industrialisation, which occurred during the 18th and 19th centuries; and the current wave of 'informisation' (johoka) (Kumon, 1996a, page 4) . The process of 'informisation'is promoting the emergence of new forms of organisation such as intellectual enterprises which Kumon calls 'intelprises', of which the archetypal examples are the rapidly diffusing international nongovernmental organisations and other nonprofit organisations. At the same time, human values as well as organisational structures are being transformed. In place of the pursuit of wealth and power which characterised earlier waves of modernisation, human beings will now tend to focus, according to Kumon, on that sharing of pleasure which Ivan Illich referred to as 'conviviality'.
The 'new age of informisation' can also be seen as having important social and political implications, one of the most significant being the emergence of a new breed of 'netizens'. Netizens will play the same role in the emerging world order as 'citizens' did in the industrial age. The use of the metaphor of a physical community (such as a town) to describe the on-line community is helpful. However, the precise implications Table 1 . Development towards information society (source: Kumon, 1996a; virtual (cyberspace) hyperglobal conviviality or boredom of the rather unappealing term netizen (originally coined by Columbia University student, Michael Hauben) to describe an emerging global community remains hazy. We are told that netizens "are likely to be much more active than citizens, especially the twentieth century citizens who came to be called 'the masses', in searching for and acquiring products and information, and also in producing and transmitting.... In other words, netizens will not merely be the recipients of information and persuasion from corporations and intelprises, but will aggressively put forth their own questions and demands" (Kumon, 1996a, page 5) . Kumon and his fellow researchers at the Center for Global Communications acknowledge that Japan has fallen behind the United States in adapting to the demands of the new information age. However, they do not seem to see this as a cause for serious pessimism about the future. After all, as Aizu Izumi, planning manager of the Center, puts it, "Japan lags behind at the moment, but this marathon has no clear finish line. Simply by taking part in the race, runners gain experience and knowledge that is used along the way" (1995, page 3).
Permanent autonomous zones A more sombre perspective on the same changes has been put forward by Kogawa (1996) . Kogawa, professor of communications studies at Tokyo University of Economics, is known for his criticism, performance art, and activism-he is a noted advocate of Tree radio' in Japan. He sees the contemporary development of information networks as a challenge to the entire fabric of capitalism. At the core of this challenge lies the appearance of digital cash, which will result in the complete separation of financial transactions from any physical form of money. In this world of digital finance, governments and corporations will only be able to maintain control over economic flows as long as they can impose a strict monopoly on digital encryption technologies, but such a monopoly, Kogawa argues (1996, pages 62-67), will be almost impossible to maintain.
On the one hand, Kogawa sees these challenges to capitalism as opening up possibilities for greater human freedom-for the creation of 'permanent autonomous zones'-but on the other he suggests that Japanese society is poorly equipped to take advantage of the possibilities of the new age. Unlike conventional mass media, Kogawa emphasises, the Internet is well adapted to the creation of small-scale, grass-roots networks serving diverse interest groups. He links its rapid development in the United States to the multicultural nature of US society, which creates a need for a multiplicity of media serving different ethnic and cultural groups (Kogawa, 1996, page 23) .
In the Japanese context, the Internet is often contrasted with conventional mass communications and seen as an electronic version of the phenomenon known as minicomi-minicommunications, or small-circulation media serving specific local communities or interest groups (Kada and Onishi, 1996) . The Internet, writes Kogawa, might be described as "minicomi for a global population", but is perhaps more accurately seen as a 'polymorphous' medium which breaks down the distinction between 'mass ' and 'mini' and between 'global' and 'local' (Kogawa, 1996, pages 56 -57) . At the same time, however, Kogawa repeatedly expresses pessimism about Japan's ability to adapt successfully to this new medium, given its strong traditions of centralised bureaucratic power and monocultural ideologies. Japan, Kogawa claims, has a topdown system which has always lacked a strong sense of civil society or public space, and without such traditions Japanese people will have great difficulty in forming the autonomous networks which will be the key to the emerging Internet society (Kogawa, 1996, pages 23, 98-102).
The Japanese Internet
There is some support for Kogawa's pessimism concerning the extent to which Japanese people will adopt the Internet. Hitherto, Japan had been a market leader in games and gaming systems (for example, Nintendo) and the Personal Handy-Phone System, but its businesses have lagged behind in the development of computer networks. Despite being conscious of the process of 'informisation' for over thirty years and having reached the number-one position in 20th century industrialisation by the late 1980s, Japan fell behind other advanced capitalist nations in developing the Internet.
Ever the optimist, Kumon (1996a) attributes the initial resistance of the Japanese more to: (a) the lack of promotion of the Internet by the Japanese government; (b) the general unwillingness of universities and research institutions to share networking resources (after receiving US$100 million from the Japanese government); (c) the reluctance of telecommunications companies to engage in multimedia and other new fields such as the Internet, which use digital technology and wide-area networks; and (d) the absence of a well-developed cable-television industry. The validity of Kumon's observations needs to be questioned because similar conditions to those in Japan also applied in Australia where there has been a ready adoption of the Internet (Nieuwenhuizen, 1997) .
Clearly, Kumon's comparison is not with Australia but with the United States. He sees Japan as being 'technologically challenged' to overcome a shortfall in the development and application of the Internet. As Japan was characterised by slow growth and text-only communication it did look as if its Internet would duplicate the home-grown academic nature of the Internet community in the United States (Linton, 1995) . Since then Japan has caught up with its overseas rivals.
Catching up Kumon's overall optimism on the growth of the Internet in Japan was not misplaced. Since the early 1990s the growth of the Internet in Japan has accelerated, aided by the release of Windows '95 in November 1995, a decline in the price of personal computers, and the release of high-quality browser software (AJEI, 1997). After December 1995 the number of articles written on the Internet in the Nikkei financial press has surpassed those on multimedia (Anderson, 1996a) . Further, the market has been 'bootstrapped' by the publication of the Internet White Report (Intanetto hakusho), increased coverage of Internet issues in the mainstream press, and an increasing number of Japanese magazines devoted to the Internet (for example, Internet Magazine and Internet User) (JIA, 1996; . Ironically, the Hanshin earthquake also promoted the spread of the net as, in the wake of the disaster, computer bulletin boards became one of the main sources of information for people seeking news of friends or relatives in the affected area (Kada and Onishi, 1996, page 215) . Virtual hometowns have also become plentiful and simulation games have been developed to allow Japanese people to lead a life in cyberspace. Much use is now made of web addresses in print, television, outdoor advertising, and on Japanese business cards.
This growth of the net is evident in the number of Internet service providers, domains, and hosts: (1) In July 1993 the first Internet service provider-Internet Initiative Japan-was established, the first 100 providers was reached by October 1995, and a further 300 were added by May 1996, according to survey data from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT, 1996). (2) In May 1992 the Japan Network Information Center (JPNIC, 1997) recorded 795 domains (.jp) but by January 1997 their number had increased to 15577 of which 11831 were connected (that is, unconnected domains were possessed by companies who had no plans to use them but wanted to preempt other companies from doing so) (table2). (3) In July 1992 there were 15757 host units in Japan but by July 1996 496427 host units were recorded (Network Wizards, 1997). In mid-1996 Japan ranked fourth in host units, behind the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom (table 3). As Japan is growing twice as fast as Germany and the United Kingdom, it is likely to move into second position behind the United States. Such a marked rise suggests that information technology will, contrary to media speculation, sustain Japan's position as a global economic power (Anderson, 1996b; . Rather than being slow in coming to the Internet, the Japanese may merely have been careful and diligent in developing a new and evolving culture to facilitate adaptation (Thieme, 1996) . In catching up with its overseas rivals Japan has retained distinctive locational and corporate biases. There was a strong concentration of Internet service providers. The point of presence of 420 commercial providers listed in Computing Japan (1996) on 12 August 1996 was spread through 126 telephone codes but only 11 had 5 or more providers (table 4) . Of these, the Tokyo telephone code had 99 providers, Osaka 31, and Nagoya 15 (31 had the toll-free number). Tokyo's predominance is understated in this figure because outer suburban areas (for example, Funabashi, Hachiqji, and Kokubunji, Tama, Fuchu) have separate codes.
This concentration within a few areas was a result of the very high tariff on digital leased lines, which was sensitive to distance (table 5). Although NTT had lowered long-distance rates, it had increased charges for calls within 15 km-the area encompassing most customers of Internet service providers (Aizu, 1995). Locational bias permeated all aspects of the supply of Internet services. In 1995 Tokyo was chosen as the commercial hub of the Internet when the top fifteen national service providers (including Internet Initiative Japan, Fujitsu, NEC, and NTT) were linked into the national service provider Internet exchange point (NSPIXP) as a first step towards establishing a backbone network. Even the second commercial hub was located in KDD's Otemachi Building in central Tokyo (NSPIXT-2). When the third hub was chosen it was located in Osaka (NSPIXT-3). No attempt was made to decentralise Internet exchanges by creating 'telco havens' in major provincial centres.
Another form of locational bias is the country's dependence, in information technology, on the United States. Most large Japanese providers get their feeds from a top-level provider in the United States. For example, Japan's largest provider, Internet Initiative Japan (a partnership of over forty companies originally established in July 1993) has links between Tokyo and San Jose (MAE-WEST) and between Osaka and Pennsauken (NY-NAP). These are connected into Japan's backbone network which is linked by leased lines to the Tokyo, Kyoto, and Fukuoka Network Operation Centres (figure 1).
Ideally, Japanese providers would like to be more independent as links between Asian countries have to pass through the United States. A joint venture between Internet Figure 1 . The Internet Initiative Japan Inc. backbone map. When the second commercial hub came on line in Tokyo most leading Internet providers linked to the national backbone increased their speed to 45 Mbps. Most providers, however, still work off leased links of 64 Kbps, which are 1/24th the size of the 1.5 Mbps norm in the United States (see Hahne, 1997) .
Initiative Japan, Sumitomo Corporation, Supernet (Hong Kong), and Pacific Internet Pte Ltd (Singapore) has established the Asian Internet Holding (AIH) Co. and created an Asian Internet backbone (ABONE) to bypass the United States. Also, the direct links between Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore are designed to enable multinational corporations based in Asia to set up wide-area networks more cheaply than by leasing dedicated lines from telecommunications companies.
Locational bias among Internet service providers was not unexpected, but it also persisted in the ZIP codes of the registered address for each connected domain on 1 April 1997 (figure 2). When the difference between the expected number of domains based on the prefectural share of total population and the actual number are mapped, Tokyo's overwhelming dominance is revealed. All other prefectures except Osaka have Furthermore, in mapping all domains we may have underestimated Tokyo's dominance. Restricting the examination to the 10442 connected corporate domains (.co) showed that the Tokyo Metropolitan region (Tokyo, Chiba, Kanagawa, and Saitama prefectures) accounted for over 64%, the Osaka region (Osaka, Hyogo, Kyoto, and Nara prefectures) had less than 16%, and the Nagoya region (Aichi and Gifu prefectures) 5%. Since July 1992, the corporate domain in Japan had increased from 61% to 68% and the organisational domain from 5% to 17%. Conversely, the academic domain had declined from over 26% to 7% and the government domain from 6% to less than 2%. This corporate orientation has enabled the Japanese to catch up more quickly.
Politics on the Internet: two case studies
A key point of some of the more Utopian visions of the Internet has been its capacity to serve as a medium through which the voices of marginalised social groups may be heard. In this sense, it has been presented by some as having the potential to broaden the bounds of civil society. On the other hand, as we have seen, writers like Kogawa express pessimism over the scope for the expansion of Internet communities in Japan, given the Japanese state's tradition of bureaucratic centralisation.
Some comparisons of earlier phases of political change in Japan may be illuminating here. In the 1870s and 1880s, for example, when contact between Japan and the Atlantic powers was expanding rapidly, the relatively unfamiliar European notions of citizenship, civic rights, and parliamentary democracy were enthusiastically debated by many Japanese intellectuals. Numerous grass-roots groups emerged to press for varying visions of democracy, often based on a synthesis of imported and local ideas. At the same time, leading reformers were conscious of the fact that the dissemination of these ideas was linked to the acquisition of unfamiliar techniques-not only the new technologies of telegraph, railways, etc, but also the less visible but equally unfamiliar techniques of speech making, debating, chairing public meetings, etc (Yoshimi, 1996; Miyamura, 1996, pages 171 -180) . Perhaps predictably, such techniques proved more accessible to some social actors than to others, and the dynamic interrelationship between political ideas and communications networks created new and shifting patterns of privilege and social inequality.
Though the contemporary political and technological context is entirely different, some of the same considerations apply today. The political implications of communications technology are shaped not only by the unequal physical access of different groups to computer terminals, but also by the climate of political ideas, the structure of existing institutions, and the unequal ability of groups to learn and to influence the rapidly changing techniques of network use. These points can be developed by consideration of two contemporary case studies. Both cases cast some light on the potential and on the limitations of the Internet as a tool for community building and citizens' action in Japan. The findings are used to draw a conclusion on the limits of virtual democracy Okinawa The first case study involves an examination of how the Internet and the print media intersected in the protest movement over US bases in Okinawa (figure 3). The Ryukyu Archipelago (now Okinawa Prefecture) was a semi-independent kingdom until 1879, with its own traditions and a language distinct from, though closely related to, Japanese. Though incorporated into Japan in the late 19th century, the region continued to experience relative deprivation in comparison with other parts of the country. After the Pacific War it was separated from the rest of Japan and occupied by the United States from 1945 to 1972. Today, with less than 1% of Japan's total land area, the prefecture still contains 75% of the territory occupied by US military bases in Japan (excluding jointly controlled facilities) (see figure 4) . The vast majority of Okinawans strongly supported the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. Since then, however, there has been a growing feeling that Okinawa has been disproportionately burdened with the costs of Japan's military alliance with the USA, and that the benefits of recent economic development in the region have generally gone to large firms based in metropolitan areas of Japan. The large-scale of presence of US bases distorts the local economy and is a cause of serious noise pollution, environmental disruption, and social tension. Between 1990 and 1994, for example, there were 28 reported cases of aggravated assault by US service personnel in Okinawa, as well as 302 cases of theft. Events were brought to a head in 1995 by the rape of a schoolgirl by US marines, and since then a vigorous campaign has been underway to reduce the US military presence in the prefecture. Increasingly, this has also become a campaign for greater Okinawan autonomy from Japan, with some local groups even calling for complete independence for the Ryukyu Islands.
In contrast to Kogawa's more pessimistic predictions, the Internet has played an important part in these campaigns. In 1996, for example, a referendum on US bases was conducted in the prefecture (figure 4). At the same time, the local government also conducted an electronic referendum, which allowed people from all over Japan (and even all over the world) to express their views on the subject via the Internet. The results, which predictably strongly favoured the removal of US bases, had no legal force, but provided an innovative way of encouraging outside interest in the Okinawa issue. More recently, a campaign was launched over the Internet to collect one million signatures on a petition for the removal of the bases, and signatures and funding are also being sought via the web for a full-page advertisement in the New York Times explaining the Okinawan position on the bases. The web is also used to keep supporters around the world informed of developments in the antibase movement, and to link into similar movements elsewhere. For example, the 'Independent Ryukyus' homepage, which states the case for Okinawan independence, provides links to a worldwide range of ethnic independence movements in other parts of the world, including the Kanak Liberation Front in New Caledonia, the Bloc Quebequois, the Irish Liberation Army, and the Tibetan independence movement. The Ainu The second case study relates to the indigenous Ainu people of northern Japan-a community which is estimated to number 50 000 -80 000, mostly living in the island of Hokkaido, although a substantial number have migrated to other areas of Japan, including Tokyo and Osaka.
In the past few years, Ainu political activity has been focused on two issues: the demand for a new Ainu law to replace the repressive 19th-century 'protection' legislation which is still on the statute book; and the protest movement against the Nibutani Dam in Southern Hokkaido. The Nibutani Dam was constructed by the Japanese government on the Saru River (known in Ainu as the Shishirimuka) from 1983 onwards ( figure .4) . It was originally designed to provide water to expanding industrial sites in the surrounding region, although by the time the dam was completed the collapse of the 'bubble' economy and the process of industrial restructuring had led to the decline of local heavy industry. This largely invalidated the official justification for the project. Nibutani is one of the few remaining villages in Hokkaido which has a predominantly Ainu population and a strong indigenous cultural base. The free-flowing Saru river played a central part in that culture as the site for salmon fishing and for the performance of a traditional annual boat-launching ceremony. Important Ainu archaeological sites lined the banks of the river, which also provided a source of willow and other plants used in religious ceremonies and Ainu crafts. Although some Nibutani villagers were willing to sell their land to the Ministry of Construction, two-Kayano Shigeru (now a member of the Upper House of the Japanese Parliament) and Kaizawa Koichi-refused. In 1989, the government used legal powers to acquire parts of their farmland forcibly for construction of the dam, and in 1993 Kaizawa and Kayano took the Japanese government to court over the matter.
Supporters of the Ainu protest movement used the Internet as a means of disseminating information about the progress of the court case, including the texts of Kaizawa's and Kayano's submissions to the court. (Kayano, who is one of the few remaining native speakers of the Ainu language, submitted his statement both in Ainu and in Japanese.) At the beginning of 1997, the Internet was also used to gather over 700 signatures on a petition against the Nibutani Dam, which was submitted to Prime Minister Hashimoto. On 27 March 1997 the Sapporo district court delivered its judgment, in which it upheld the appellants' complaint that the government's compulsory purchase of their land had been illegal. The court ruled that the Ministry of Construction had failed to recognise the legitimate cultural rights of the Ainu people as indigenous inhabitants of the Nibutani region. However, the dam was now complete, and the judgment failed to go so far as ordering the destruction of the dam or the return of the land. Once again, the Internet was used to keep supporters informed of the decision, which was seen as a significant step in establishing official recognition of the status and rights of the Ainu as indigenous people with their own distinct culture. Web sites have also been constructed to disseminate general information about Ainu culture and history, and to offer basic instruction in the Ainu language. These sites are assuming increasing importance since the replacement in 1997 of the old 'protection' legislation with the Ainu Cultural Promotion Law, which provides a measure of government support for the maintenance of the Ainu language and culture.
The case of Ainu activism, however, also illustrates some of the limitations of the Internet as a network for grass-roots political action. As Japanese observers have pointed out, substantial use of the Internet by grass-roots groups requires the employment of people with skills to maintain web pages and computer systems and to interact with other users at home and abroad which, in turn, often requires high levels of fluency in written English. As all these skills are expensive to obtain in Japan, community groups are often unable to train or recruit the human resources necessary to make extensive use of the net (Furuse and Hirose, 1996, pages 132-136) . The largest Ainurepresentative group, the Hokkaido Ainu Association (known as the Hokkaido Utari Association until 1997) still has no website. When interviewed in October 1997, a representative of the Association said that they had no_current_plans_to_ establish a site. The main reason for this was that the Association lacked the resources needed to keep a site updated and to respond to the many enquiries which they could expect to receive if they were linked to the Internet.
Conclusion: the limits of virtual democracy
These case studies illuminate some of the key features of the potential role of the Internet for citizens' movements discussed by Kumon and Kogawa. In both case studies the Internet has been successfully used to focus attention and to disseminate information and coordinate activities on a relatively specific and rapidly changing political issue. In particular, the net has made it possible to mobilise people, around Japan and overseas, who may otherwise have merely been passive sympathisers. Home pages related to Ainu and Okinawan issues have enabled these supporters to obtain information which would not normally be available in the mass media, and to take part in activities such as the signing of petitions, e-mailing protest letters, and financing of advertisements related to the protest issue. It is worth noting that these activities have generally been pioneered by very small groups or enthusiastic individuals, rather than by established political parties or large organisations. Although Okinawa Prefecture has been relatively active in disseminating information through the Internet, the main sources which have been quoted here are home pages set up by individual activists, whereas larger well-established groups, such as Hokkaido Ainu Association, have yet to develop use of the Internet to spread their message.
The speed with which use of the Internet has been adopted by some citizens' groups in Japan raises questions about Kogawa's pessimistic appraisal of the absence of public space in Japan. We would argue, on the contrary that Japan has quite a long tradition of an active civil society in the form of grass-roots citizens' movements, often concerned with local environmental, social, or consumer issues. What has been lacking, however, is a strong link between such grass-roots movements and the centres of Japanese political power and decisionmaking. Traditionally, citizens' movements have been run by people in nonelite social positions, especially women, who were more likely than salaried men to have sufficient control over their own time to become involved in community activities. This has commonly made it difficult for such groups to gain access to prefectural and national decisionmakers, and made it easy for mainstream politicians and political commentators to trivialise citizens' groups as parochial and irrelevant.
As perceived by Kumon, the Internet is likely to have some important implications for patterns of grass-roots citizens' activity. For one thing, accessing Internet information, participating in electronic petitions, and similar electronic involvement is an almost instantaneous activity which can be carried out at any time of the night or day-there is no need for participants to organise their schedule around the times of meetings or demonstrations. In this sense it helps to overcome one of the most significant, though invisible, barriers-lack of time-which has restricted full-time workers from involving themselves in political causes. The Internet in Japan is still overwhelmingly a male world (as noted, some 93% of users are men), and it is likely that it is encouraging greater participation by men-and particularly by full-time 'salarymen'-in grass-roots political organisation.
At the same time, however, Internet citizens' activities of the sort discussed by Kumon have certain obvious limitations. Unlike the conventional mass media, which preach to the unconverted, these Internet groups are generally accessed by those who already have an interest in the issue concerned. Although they may be effective in mobilising potential supporters, they have relatively little effect in winning over the large mass of a generally apathetic population. Without the weight of voter power or the backing of powerful financial interests, citizens' groups organised over the net will still find it difficult to sway the opinion of the major political parties or key governmental decisionmakers. Too often, petitions or letters of protest are simply ignored by those in power. Despite the effective electronic organisation of the Okinawan campaign, for example, the Japanese government has still managed to strike a deal with the main parties to ensure the passage of a new law allowing the state to secure land compulsorily for the US bases in Okinawa.
Without more fundamental changes in the organisation of politics in Japan and elsewhere, then, the role of the Internet in transforming political life along the lines advocated by Kumon is likely to remain quite limited. There is a danger that its main function will be to promote a sort of 'virtual democracy', where net-based exchanges of information and activities, such as e-mailing politicians, give citizens an illusion of involvement in political activity without actually influencing the outcome of political processes. To turn this virtual democracy into something more substantial will require changes in the way that major political parties, mainstream politicians, and government ministries use the net. So far, they have treated it largely as a conventional propaganda tool. All the major Japanese political parties and government ministries now have home pages, but these are used largely to disseminate policy documents, speeches, etc, rather than to develop a more interactive dialogue with citizens (though the Social Democratic Party does at least provide a 'letter page' for responses from users of its home page). Turning the Internet into a channel through which citizens might genuinely have greater influence on political life will require more than communications technology itself. It will need a restructuring of political organisation and political attitudes so that existing institutions are actually equipped to seek out and pay attention to the views of voters and grass-roots organisations.
